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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No: 13-1704 
______________ 
 
JOSEPH P. FRANKENBERRY, 
Appellant 
 
v.  
 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION;  
U.S. DEPTARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
 
_______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(Civ. No. 3-08-cv-01565) 
District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo  
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 9, 2013 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, FUENTES and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: May 15, 2014) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 Joseph P. Frankenberry appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation on its withholding of information under Freedom of 
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Information Act (FOIA) exemptions.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the 
district court’s decision.  
I. 
 As we write only for the parties who are familiar with the facts and procedural 
history, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our conclusion.
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 We apply a two-tiered test when reviewing a district court’s order granting 
summary judgment in proceedings seeking disclosure under FOIA.  We must “first 
decide whether the district court had an adequate factual basis for its determination.”  
Abdelfattah v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 488 F.3d 178, 182 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations 
omitted).  If it did, we “must then decide whether that determination was clearly 
erroneous.”  Id. (citations omitted).  We will reverse the district court’s decision only “if 
the findings are unsupported by substantial evidence, lack adequate evidentiary support in 
the record, are against the clear weight of the evidence or where the district court has 
misapprehended the weight of the evidence.”  Lame v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 767 F.2d 66, 
69–70 (3d Cir. 1985).   
II. 
 Congress passed FOIA “to facilitate public access to Government documents.”  
U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991).   To that end, government agencies 
must surrender any records requested unless the information is exempt from disclosure 
                                              
1
 The district court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(4)(B) 
and 701-706 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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under one of nine FOIA exemptions.  Davin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 60 F.3d 1043, 1049 
(3d Cir. 1995); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)–(9) (2012) (listing the exemptions).  
A. 
 Frankenberry claims that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to 
the FBI on exemption 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C).  Under Exemption 7(C), an agency is not 
required to disclose records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes that 
“could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy.”  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C).  When a government agency claims Exemption 7(C), 
the court must “weigh[] the privacy interest and the extent to which it is invaded, on the 
one hand, against the public benefit that would result from disclosure, on the other.” 
Ferri v. Bell, 645 F.2d 1213, 1217 (3d Cir. 1981).   
 A district court must first determine whether a privacy interest exists.  Individuals 
involved in a criminal investigation possess a privacy interest “in not having their names 
revealed in connection with disclosure of the fact and subject matter of the investigation.” 
Davin, 60 F.3d at 1058.  Deceased individuals lack this privacy interest under FOIA, and 
“it is within the discretion of the district court to require an agency to demonstrate that 
the individuals upon whose behalf it claims the privacy exemption are, in fact, alive.”  Id. 
at 1059.  If the district court orders the agency to show that certain individuals are alive, 
and the agency is unable to do so, “a court must assure itself that the Government has 
made a reasonable effort to ascertain life status. . . . in light of the accessibility of the 
relevant information.”  Schrecker v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 349 F.3d 657, 662 (D.C. Cir. 
2003).  
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 Once the government establishes a relevant privacy interest, the district court 
weighs it against the public interest.  The public interest under Exemption 7(C) is narrow: 
the only relevant public interest is the interest in information that “sheds light on an 
agency’s performance of its statutory duties.”  Davin, 60 F.3d at 1059 (quoting U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989)). In 
other words, “whether disclosure of a private document under Exemption 7(C) is 
warranted must turn on the nature of the requested document and its relationship to ‘the 
basic purpose of the Freedom of Information Act ‘to open agency action to the light of 
public scrutiny.’”  Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 772.  
 Frankenberry contends that the FBI failed to establish a privacy interest under 
Exemption 7(C) because it did not make reasonable efforts to determine the life status of 
the individuals upon whose behalf it claimed a privacy interest.  As the district court 
found, however, the FBI reviewed the available records and cross-referenced information 
from prior FOIA requests and internal records in its attempt to determine the life status of 
non-FBI employees.  The FBI also attempted to search the Consolidated Lead Evaluation 
and Reporting database but was unable to do so because the responsive documents lacked 
these individuals’ birth dates and social security numbers.  Similarly, the FBI could not 
determine the life status of its retired employees because it lacked their birth dates and 
social security numbers.  Based on this information, the district court found that the FBI 
made reasonable efforts to determine the life status of the individuals upon whose behalf 
it claimed a privacy interest.  The district court therefore had an adequate factual basis for 
this determination, and its conclusion was not clearly erroneous.   
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 Frankenberry also unpersuasively argues that the public interest in exposing FBI 
misconduct outweighs any privacy interest the FBI may establish.  To establish the 
exposure of government misconduct as a public interest, however, Frankenberry must 
“produce evidence that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the alleged 
Government impropriety might have occurred.”  Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. 
Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 174 (2004).  That is, he has to “establish more than a bare 
suspicion in order to obtain disclosure.”  Id.  Yet Frankenberry relies only on a vague 
assertion that the requested material “may” reveal information proving FBI misconduct.  
Because his assertion falls short of the Favish standard, the district court properly found 
that Frankenberry failed to show a relevant public interest.  Accordingly, the district court 
did not clearly err by granting the FBI’s motion for summary judgment on Exemption 
7(C).   
B. 
 Frankenberry also claims that the district court erred in granting summary 
judgment to the FBI on exemption 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D).  Under Exemption 7(D), an 
agency is not required to disclose records or information compiled for law enforcement 
purposes that 
could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential 
source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any 
private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, 
in the case of a record or information compiled by criminal law 
enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an 
agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, 
information furnished by a confidential source.   
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5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D).  A source is confidential only “if the source ‘provided 
information under an express assurance of confidentiality or in circumstances from which 
such an assurance could reasonably be inferred.’”  Davin, 60 F.3d at 1061 (quoting U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 172 (1993)).  
 The FBI bears the burden of proving that Exemption 7(D) applies.  Id. at 1061.  It 
carries this burden by establishing that it expressly or impliedly granted confidentiality to 
the sources identified in the documents it seeks to exempt.  Id. at 1061–62.  To establish 
that the FBI expressly granted confidentiality to a source, the FBI must “come forward 
with probative evidence that the source did in fact receive an express grant of 
confidentiality.”  Id. at 1061.  By contrast, the FBI is entitled to a presumption that it 
impliedly granted confidentiality to a source “when circumstances such as the nature of 
the crime investigated and the witness’ relation to it support an inference of 
confidentiality.”  Id. at 1062 (quoting Landano, 508 U.S. at 181).   
 Frankenberry argues that the FBI failed to establish that the nineteen pages of 
documents it seeks to exempt under Exemption 7(D) contain sources to whom the FBI 
expressly or impliedly granted confidentiality.  This argument fails for two reasons.  
 First, the district court properly found that the FBI withheld some of the 
documents because they contain a source to whom the FBI had expressly granted 
confidentiality.  The district court determined that the FBI had established an express 
grant of confidentiality on two documents—Frankenberry-58 and Frankenberry-60—
because these documents contain notations proving that the source had expressly 
requested and been granted confidentiality.  The FBI then submitted a declaration 
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explaining that the individual discussed on Frankenberry-58 and Frankenberry-60 is the 
same individual discussed on a number of other pages.  Based on this information, the 
district court held that the FBI had established that it rightly withheld all of these pages 
under an express assurance of confidentiality.   
 Second, the district court adequately determined that the FBI withheld the 
remaining documents under an implied assurance of confidentiality.  After examining the 
relevant documents, the district court concluded that the nature of the investigation and 
the sources’ relationship to the investigation demonstrated that the information was 
provided under an implied assurance of confidentiality.  The district court therefore based 
these determinations on a sufficient factual basis.  For these reasons, the district court did 
not clearly err by granting the FBI’s motion for summary judgment on Exemption 7(D). 
C. 
  Last, Frankenberry claims that the district court erred in granting summary 
judgment to the FBI on exemption 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E).  Under Exemption 7(E), an 
agency is not required to disclose records or information compiled for law enforcement 
purposes that “would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement 
investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement 
investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk 
circumvention of the law.”  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E). 
 The FBI claimed Exemption 7(E) as a basis for redacting the ratings column of 
Form FD-515 and withholding documents relating to polygraph examinations.  The FBI 
invoked Exemption 7(E) on the ratings column of Form FD-515 because it evaluates the 
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effectiveness of an investigative technique.  According to the FBI, redacting this portion 
of Form FD-515 is therefore necessary to prevent criminals from adapting their 
techniques based on the ratings column information.  For the documents relating to 
polygraph examinations, the FBI claimed Exemption 7(E) because criminals could use 
this information to understand how the FBI implements the procedures and intricacies of 
a polygraph examination, which could risk circumvention of the law.   
 Frankenberry relies exclusively on Milner v. Department of Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259 
(2011), as support for his argument that the district court erred in granting the FBI 
summary judgment on the Form FD-515 and polygraph documents.  Frankenberry, 
however, misconstrues this case, so his reliance on it is misplaced.   
 Milner dealt with the scope of exemption 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2), which allows an 
agency to withhold material that is “related solely to the internal personnel rules and 
practices of an agency.”  131 S. Ct. at 1262 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2)).  In Milner, 
the Navy had invoked this exemption to withhold data and maps related to the storage of 
explosives.  Id.  But the Court concluded that “[a]n agency’s ‘personnel rules and 
practices’ are its rules and practices dealing [only] with employee relations or human 
resources.”  Id. at 1265 (emphasis added).  Because data and maps related to the storage 
of explosives do not relate to employee relations or human resources, the Court held the 
Navy could not invoke this exemption.  Id. at 1266. 
 Frankenberry claims that the district court improperly used Milner as a basis to 
withhold the Form FD-515 and polygraph documents, but he misunderstands Milner’s 
role in the district court’s decision on Exemption 7(E).  The FBI did in fact originally 
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invoke 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2), in addition to Exemption 7(E), to withhold the Form FD-
515 and polygraph documents.  But the district court—and the FBI itself—subsequently 
concluded that exemption 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) was no longer applicable in light of 
Milner, given that the Form FD-515 and polygraph documents do not relate to employee 
relations or human resources.   
 The district court then correctly concluded that the FBI could still withhold these 
documents but under the other exemption it invoked—Exemption 7(E).  See Milner, 131 
S. Ct. at 1271 (finding that the government can withhold documents under other FOIA 
exemptions if 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) does not apply).  For the ratings column on the Form 
FD-515 document, the district court found that the FBI had specifically shown that it 
reveals the effectiveness of certain investigative techniques and releasing it could thus 
risk circumvention of the law.  Concerning the polygraph information documents, the 
district court determined that the FBI had sufficiently established that they contain 
investigation techniques that could also risk circumvention of the law if disclosed.  
Consequently, the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the FBI on these 
documents had an adequate factual basis and was not clearly erroneous.
2
    
IV. 
                                              
2
 The district court also held that the FBI had properly withheld documents that contain 
information related to money expenditures in the FBI investigation.  This information 
relates to “procedures for law enforcement investigations” because it shows where the 
FBI concentrates its resources in an investigation.  The disclosure of this information 
could therefore risk circumvention of the law.  As a result, the district court did not 
clearly err in finding that these documents were also exempt under Exemption 7(E).  
Moreover, as the government asserts that the relevant documents have since been 
released to Frankenberry, the issue is now moot.      
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 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of the district court. 
